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ABSTRACT
One of the intriguing aspects of Smith's developing analysis of the division of labour is the
presence throughout of the example of the philosopher and the porter.   Few readers will
forget Smith's well-known dictum to the effect that in any developed society there are those:
'whose trade it is, not to do anything, but to observe everything; and who, upon that account,
are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar
objects.  In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other
employment, the principal and sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens.
Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches,
each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this
subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in  every other business improves
dexterity, and saves time.  Each individual becomes more expert in his own particular
branch, and more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is improved by
it' (WN, I.ii.9; LJ, 347, 470).
Smith also suggested that:
'The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware
of' and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions,
when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of
the diffusion of labour.  The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from
nature, as from habit, custom, and education' (WN.I.ii.4).ii
It is the task of this paper to consider Smith's views as to the way in which philosophers, ie,
scientists, behave by  reference, not only to the essay on Astronomy, but also to the
Theory of Moral Sentiments, the Lectures on Rhetoric, and the Wealth of Nations.
The argument is divided into the following parts:
Section 1 considers a broadly 'sociological' theme in examining Smith's views with regard to
the philosopher's pursuit of status and reputation.
Section II elaborates upon the link between reputation and the power to persuade.  In this
section we consider Smith's rules for the organisation of discourse, including didactic
discourse, placing emphasis on the attractions of the Newtonian method of exposition.  It
was in this context that Smith drew attention to the possibility that the Newtonian (and
Cartesian) method may be employed by philosophers because it is more ingenious, and
therefore more attractive to the mind.
Section III extends the essentially psychological aspect of the discussion in addressing the
'principles which lead and direct' philosophical enquiry by reference to the Astronomy
where Smith considered the role of sentiments, such as surprise, wonder and admiration.
Philosophy in all its forms emerges as the 'science of the connecting principles of nature'
(II.12) whose ultimate end is the 'repose and tranquillity of the imagination' (IV.13).
Section IV widens the argument by addressing the historical dimension of the essay.  This
section was used by Smith to illustrate the process of development, modification, and
replacement of different systems.  But in the present context the emphasis is on the
problems of communication which exist between the proponents of different systems andiii
upon the associated problems which arise a consequence of the division of labour in
science; a division which increases the quantity of science and decreases our capacity to
communicate across disciplines.
Section V summarises the argument so far before gong on to examine Smith's views as to
the performance of the philosopher when operating within a given institutional
environment.  It is in this context that we examine Smith's contention that the efficiency of
the teacher can only be relied upon when he or she operates within an environment which
induces them to do their duty.
This argument is important in its own right.  But it would also seem to be somewhat
inconsistent with Smith's theory of knowledge and with his emphasis upon the point that
men desire not only praise but praiseworthiness.  These passages in the Wealth of
Nations were among the last which Smith wrote on the subject of the behaviour of the
philosopher and would appear to represent a considered view as to the performance of the
academic teacher.  Perhaps the contrast is between the 'solitary philosopher' and the
teacher who is a member of an academic community.  If so, it is not a flattering comparison.
More was to come.  Smith's conclusion was that if the academic community proved
incapable of self-regulation, then the alternative was external regulation with all its attendant
dangers.1
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I
While there is a debate regarding the origins of the modern analysis of the division of
labour, it is plausible to suggest that Smith may have first encountered the problem as a
result of hearing Francis Hutcheson's lectures when a student in Glasgow between 1737
and 1740.
Hutcheson's work on economic topics has its own history.  It is evident that he admired the
contribution of his immediate predecessor in the Chair of Moral Philosophy - Gershom
Carmichael (1672-1729), and especially his translation of, and commentary on the works of,
Samuel Pufendorf.  In Hutcheson's address to the 'students in Universities' (Taylor, 1965, p
25) the Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1742) is described thus:
'The learned will at once discern how much of this compound is taken from the writing of
others, from Cicero and Aristotle, and to name no other moderns, from Pufendorf's smaller
work, De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem which that worthy and
ingenious man the late Professor Gerschom Carmichael of Glasgow, by far the best
commentator on that book, has so supplied and corrected that the notes are of much more
value than the text.'
The order and the content of the analyses of economic subjects is indeed strikingly similar.
Both Pufendorf and Hutcheson gave a great deal of emphasis to the division of labour as
the source of increased productivity in modern times, and as the means of maximising the
disposable surpluses which individuals could command.  Both confirm the importance of the
security of property thus generated, and paid a great deal of attention to the problem of
value in exchange.  It was in this context that Hutcheson considered the importance of2
subjective judgment with regard to the valuation of commodities to be acquired and to the
valuation of the disutility of effort involved in the creation of the commodities to be used in
exchange.  For these reasons Edwin Cannan suggested that the 'germ of the Wealth of
Nations is to be found in Hutcheson's treatment of value' (1896, p xxvi; Skinner, 1995).
Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence show the extent to which he had advanced beyond his
teacher.  Most obviously, Smith's lectures confirm that he had placed the discussion of
economic topics in a discourse, which, while linked to the discussion of jurisprudence was to
be seen as separate from it.  The discussion of the sources of increased productivity was
also much more elaborate; a fact further confirmed by the content of chapter 2 of the Early
Draft.  There are, of course, differences between these documents (cf Meek and Skinner,
1973).  For example, the link between the division of labour and the extent of the market,
mentioned in LJ, does not figure in ED but was to be given the dignity of a separate chapter
in WN (I.iii).  The WN does not give prominence to the 'oppressive inequality' of the modern
state (ED, 563; LJ, 340-1)., but transformed the significance of the earlier discussion by
placing it in the context of a capital-using system, characterised by the use of distinct factors
of production and categories of return.  It is only the words on the page that remain the
same.
But one of the most intriguing features of all these documents is the attention given to the
philosopher and the porter.  To begin with, Smith makes the obvious point that: 'Among
men...the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their
respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought,
as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the
produce of other men's talents he has occasion for' (WN, I.iii.5).
Secondly, he noted that in any developed society there are those:3
'whose trade it is, not to do anything, but to observe everything; and who, upon that account,
are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar
objects.  In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other
employment, the principal and sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens.
Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches,
each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this
subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business improves
dexterity, and saves time.  Each individual becomes more expert in his own particular
branch, and more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is improved by
it' (WN.I.ii.9; LJ, 347, 570).
Thirdly, Smith suggested:
'The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware
of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions,
when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of
the division of labour.  The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from
nature, as from habit, custom, and education' (WN.I.ii.4).
Smith accepted Hume's thesis that 'there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in
all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and
operations' (Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (VII.7)).  Yet it is equally clear,
not least in the TMS, that the constant principles of human nature are consistent with a wide
range of behaviour.   Looked at in this way, the significant difference between the
philosopher and others is to be found, in part, in his powers of perception.  For example,4
Smith cites the case of artisans such as dyers, brewers, and distillers, who handle
processes which strike the skilled observer as complex, but which do not seem so to the
artisan himself 'who has been for many years familiar with the consequences of all the
operations of his art'.  In a passage which may reflect his own experience, Smith records the
amusement which such questions often excite, since the artisan 'cannot conceive what
occasion there is for any connecting events to unite those appearances, which seem to him
to succeed each other vary naturally.  It is their nature, he tells us, to follow one another in
this order, and that accordingly they always do so' (Astronomy, II.11).  Similarly, Smith
remarked that 'After a little use and experience...looking-glasses cease to be wonders
altogether; and even the ignorant become so familiar with them, as not to think that their
effects require any explication' (Imitative Arts, I.17).  But just as the botanist differs from
the casual gardener, or the musician from his auditor, so philosopher acquires 'if one may
say so, a nicer ear...' (Astronomy, II.11).  It is Smith's views as to the behaviour of the
philosopher (ie, scientist) with which this paper will be concerned.
II
First we should note the presence of a broadly sociological dimension in Smith's discussion.
'To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the most decisive mark
of what is called genius or superior talents.  The public admiration which attends upon such.
distinguished abilities makes always a part of their reward' (WN, I.x.b.24).
Public admiration may be taken to refer to literary or scientific reputation and here Smith had
some interesting observations to make in the Theory of Moral Sentiments:5
'We may judge of the propriety or impropriety of the sentiments of another person by their
correspondence or disagreement with our own, upon two different occasions; either first,
when the objects which excite them are considered without any peculiar relation, either to
ourselves or to the person whose sentiments we judge of or, secondly, when they are
considered as peculiarly affecting one or other of us' (TMS, I.i.4.1).
Objects which lack a peculiar relation include 'the expression of a picture, the composition
of a discourse...all the general subjects of science and taste'.  For Smith, the characteristic
feature of such judgement is that we look at "a picture, a poem, or a system of philosophy'
from the 'same station' (TMS, 1,i.4.5):
'We look at them from the same point of view, and we have no occasion for sympathy, or for
that imaginary change of situations from which it arises, in order to produce, with regard to
these, the most perfect harmony of sentiments and affections' (TMS, I.i.4.2).
Yet at the same time he noted a similarity with the nature of moral judgment, arising from
the fact that to 'approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt
them is to approve of them' (TMS, I.i.3.2).
Smith further observed that:
'There are some very noble and beautiful arts, in which the degree of excellence can be
determined only by a certain nicety of taste, of which the decisions, however, appear
always, in some measure, uncertain.  There are others, in which the success admits, either
of clear demonstration, or very unsatisfactory proof.  Among the candidates for excellence in
those different arts, the anxiety about public opinion is always much greater in the former
than in the latter' (TMS, III.2.18).6
Smith had earlier remarked that some philosophers, notably mathematicians, 'are frequently
very indifferent' about the reception which they may meet with from the public, enjoying as
they do the 'most perfect assurance, both of the truth and of the importance of their
discoveries'.  He added:
'The great work of Sir Isaac Newton, his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, I
have been told, was for several years neglected by the public.  The tranquillity of that great
man, it is probable, never suffered, upon that account, the interruption of a single quarter of
an hour.  Natural philosophers, in their independency upon the public opinion, approach
nearly to mathematicians, and, in their judgments concerning the merit of their own
discoveries and observations, enjoy some degree of the same security and tranquillity' (TMS
III.2.20).
The contrast is between the philosopher sure of his results but uncertain of his reception
and the great mathematician who is confident of his contribution.  Yet both are 'candidates
for excellence' and both are likely to be conscious of literary or scientific reputation as a
source of distinction.  As Smith remarked, when the opinions of another person:
'not only coincide with our own, but lead and direct our own; when in forming them he
appears to have attended to many things which we had overlooked, and to have adjusted
them to all the various circumstances of their objects; we not only approve of them, but
wonder and are surprised at their uncommon and unexpected acuteness and
comprehensiveness, and he appears to deserve a very high degree of admiration and
applause.  For approbation   heightened by wonder and surprise, constitutes the sentiment
which is properly called admiration, and of which applause is the natural expression' (TMS,
I.i.4.3).7
We may note in passing that Smith was not insensible to the benefits of reputation even if
he was aware of the dangers of ambition.  Few readers of the TMS will fail to remember his
ironic reference to the poor man 'whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition'
(IV.1.8) or his reference to 'place, the great object which divides the wives of aldermen' as
being the 'end of half the labours of human life' (TMS.I.iii.2.8).  Perhaps these ironic
passages prompted Hume to write to Smith, following the publication of the TMS in 1759 in
the following terms.  Having commented on every conceivable subject other than that which
Smith wanted to hear, le bon David concluded:
'My Dear Mr Smith, have Patience; Compose yourself to Tranquillity: Show yourself a
Philosopher in Practice as well as Profession: Think on the Emptiness, and Rashness, and
Futility of the common Judgements of Men: How little they are regulated by Reason in any
Subject, much more in philosophical Subjects, which so far exceed the Comprehension of
the Vulgar...A wise man's Kingdom is his own Breast; Or, if he ever looks farther, it will only
be to the Judgement of a select few, who are free from Prejudices, and capable of
examining his work.  Nothing indeed can be a stronger presumption of Falshood than the
Approbation of the Multitude; and Phocion, you know, always suspected himself of some
Blunder, when he was attended with the Applauses of the Populace.
Supposing, therefore, that you have duely  prepared yourself for the worst by all these
Reflections: I proceed to tell you the melancholy News that your Book has been very
unfortunate: For the Public seem disposed to applaud it extremely' (Corr, letter 31, dated 12
April).
III8
While these themes are incidental to the main drift of the Moral Sentiments, Smith's
students would be well aware that they were central to the Lectures of Rhetoric with their
attendant emphasis on the theory of communication.
Looked at in this way, reputation depends to a significant extent on the power to persuade.
Indeed, Smith had noted in his Lectures on Rhetoric, that three elements are needed in a
sound author:
'1
st - That he have a complete knowledge of his  Subjects; 2ndly That he should arrange all
the parts of his Subject in their proper order; 3rdly, That he paint or describe the Ideas he
has of these severall in the most proper and expressive manner; this is the art of painting or
imitation' (LRBL, i.104-105).
In LRBL, Smith considered the forms of discourse which were employed in the
communication of ideas through the medium of the spoken or written word.  In Smith's
view all examples of the written word could be reduced to four broad types: the poetical,
where the purpose is to entertain; the historical, which is intended to relate some fact or
facts; the didactic, where the purpose is to prove some proposition; and the oratorical.
These different types of discourse, in Smith's view, shared common elements although
differing in purpose and therefore in organisation.  Thus for example he suggested that the
rules of narrative (ie, historical) discourse were the same for the poetical even though the
purpose of poetical discourse was entertainment while historical discourse aimed to instruct.
In the same way he suggested that while both didactic (ie, scientific) and rhetorical
discourses were intended to prove some proposition they differ in that the former 'proposes
to put before us the arguments on both sides of the question in their true light, giving each
its proper degree of influence, and has it in view to perswade no further than the arguments9
themselves appear convincing'.  That is, he suggests that didactical discourse seeks to
persuade 'only so far as the strength of the argument is convincing' (LRBL, i.150).
Smith addressed the question of didactic (scientific) writing in a lecture dated 24 January
1763, apparently delivered 'sine libro, except what he read from Livy'.  In this lecture he
suggested that didactic writing could have one of two aims: either to 'Lay Down a proposition
and prove this by the different arguments which lead to that conclusion', or to deliver a
system in any science (LRBL, II.125).  In the first case the writer may seek to prove a single
proposition or present a complex proposition which requires proof of several subordinate
ones.  In this context, Smith recommended that 'these subordinate propositions should not
be above 5 at most.  When they exceed this number the mind cannot easily comprehend
them at one view; and the whole runs into confusion.  Three, or there-about, is a very proper
number' (LRBL, ii.,126).
The second function of didactic discourse, namely the delivery of a system in any science,
also presents the writer with a choice.  As Smith put it:
'in Naturall Philosophy, or any other Science of that Sort, we may either like Aristotle go over
the Different branches in the order they happen to cast up to us, giving a principle
commonly a new one for every phaenomenon; or, in the manner of Sir Isaac Newton, we
may lay down certain principles known or proved in the beginning, from whence we account
for the severall Phenomenon, connecting all together by the same Chain.  This Latter, which
we may call the Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most Philosophical, and in every
science, whether of Moralls or Naturall Philosophy, etc, is vastly more ingenious, and for
that reason more engaging than the other' (LRBL, ii.133).
Smith went on to assert that:10
'It gives us a pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable
all deduced from some principle (commonly a well-known one) and all united in one chain,
far superior to what we feel from the unconnected method where everything is accounted for
by itself without any reference to the others.  We need not be surprised then that the
Cartesian philosophy (for Descartes was in reality the first who attempted this method),
though it does not perhaps contain a word of truth, and to us who live in a more enlighten'd
age and have more enquired into these matters, it appears very Dubious, should
nevertheless have been so universally received by all the Learned in Europe at that time.
The Great Superiority of the method over that of Aristotle, the only one then known, and the
little enquiry that was then made into those matters, made them greedily receive a work
which we justly esteem one of the most entertaining Romances that has ever been wrote'
(LRBL, ii.134).
There are perhaps two points arising from this statement which deserve more than a
passing mention.  First, it will be observed that Smith credits both Newton and Descartes
with the same method of exposition, even although a more 'enlightened' age had now
perceived that the Cartesian system of physics was no more than an entertaining,
romance.  Smith was well aware of the point that the principles governing the organisation
of didactic of scientific discourse are distinct from those rules of procedure which constitute
scientific method properly so called.
Secondly, Smith drew attention to the possibility that the Newtonian (or Cartesian) 'method'
may be employed by the philosopher because it is more engaging than the Aristotelian.  It is
also interesting to note that Smith should have referred elsewhere to a propensity, natural
to all men, 'to account for all appearances from as few principles as possible' (TMS,
VII.ii.2.14).11
IV
These (essentially psychological) issues were further explored in the Essays on
Philosophical Subjects, most notably in the Astronomy, where Smith considered the
'principles which lead and direct' philosophical enquiry.
The psychological assumptions which Smith employed in the essays under discussion are
fundamentally simple: he assumes that man is endowed with certain faculties and
propensities such as reason, reflection, and imagination, and that he is motivated by a
desire to acquire (or to avoid) the sources of pleasure (or pain).  In this context pleasure
relates to a state of the imagination, or 'What may be called the natural state of the mind,
the state in which we are neither elated nor dejected, the state of sedateness, tranquility,
and composure...' (Imitative Arts, 11. 20).  Such a state may be attained where we
contemplate objects which satisfy certain conditions; conditions which are quite well
expressed in a passage from the Theory of Moral Sentiments where it is pointed out that
'Connected variety, in which each new appearance seems to be introduced by what went
before it, and in which all the ajoining parts seem to have some natural relation to one
another, is more agreeable than a disjointed and disorderly assemblage of unconnected
objects' (V. 1. 9).  We derive a feeling of pleasure Smith argues, from the contemplation of
relation, similarity, or order; from a certain association of ideas.  As Smith remarked in a
passage which clearly shows the influence of Hume:
'When two objects, however unlike, have often been observed to follow each other, and
have constantly presented themselves to the senses in that order, they come to be so
connected together in the fancy, that the idea of the one seems, of its own accord, to call up
and introduce that of the other.  If the objects are still observed to succeed each other as12
before, this connection, or, as it has been called, this association of their ideas, becomes
stricter and stricter, and the habit of the imagination to pass from the conception of the one
to that of the other, grows more and more rivetted and confirmed' (Astronomy, II.7).
He added that under such circumstances 'There is no break, no stop, no gap, no interval.
The ideas excited by so coherent a chain of things seem, as it were, to float through the
mind of their own accord, without obliging it to exert itself, or to make any effort in order to
pass from one of them to another' (11.7).   While emphasising that the imagination is
indolent and that men find no stimulus to thought under such conditions, Smith struck a
more original note in going on to argue that this would not be the case where the
'appearances' were in any way irregular or unexpected:
'But if this customary connection be interrupted, if one or more objects appear in an order
quite different from that to which the imagination has been accustomed, and for which it is
prepared, the contrary of all this happens.  We are at first surprised by the unexpectedness
of the new appearance, and when that momentary emotion is over, we still wonder how it
came to occur in that place' (11.3).
In other words we feel surprise when some object (or number, of objects) is drawn to our
attention which does not fall into an expected pattern; a sentiment quickly followed by that of
wonder, where the latter is defined in these terms: 'The stop which is thereby given to the
career of the imagination, the difficulty which it finds in passing along such disjointed
objects, and the feeling of something like a gap or interval betwixt them, constitute the whole
essence of this emotion' (II.9).
In the sphere of philosophy Smith argued that the perception of a 'gap' between phenomena
leads directly to an attempt to explain it thus contributing to relieve the mind from a state of13
disequilibrium.  As he put it, the mind 'endeavours to find out something which may fill up
the gap, which, like a bridge may so far at least unite those seemingly disjointed objects, as
to render the passage of the thought between them smooth, and natural, and easy' (II.8).
The intellectual 'bridge' is a telling metaphor.
It will be noted that man is impelled to seek an explanation for observed appearances as a
result of some subjective feeling of discomfort, and that the resulting explanation is
therefore designed to meet some psychological need.  Smith also argues that the
explanation offered can only satisfy the mind if it is coherent, capable of accounting for
observed appearances, and stated in terms of 'familiar' or plausible principles.
Philosophy in all its forms, thus emerges as 'the science of the connecting principles of
nature' (II.12), with, as its ultimate end, 'the repose and tranquility of the imagination' (IV.13).
Although these motives are of universal application, the purposes of philosophy are made
especially clear in Smith's discussion of astronomy, where he argues that the task of theory
is to introduce 'order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to ally this tumult
of the imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the great revolutions of the universe, to
that tone of tranquility and composure, which is both most agreeable in itself, and most
suitable to its nature' (II.12).
This position anticipated G L S Shackle's view that the 'scientist's ultimate aim is to see
everything as an illustration of a very few basic principles incapable of further unification'.
There is an even more dramatic parallel in the following statement, which could well serve
as a summary of Smith's whole thesis:
'The chief service rendered by a theory is the setting of minds at rest.  So long as we have a
satisfying conceptual structure, a model or a taxonomy which provides for the filing of all14
facts in a scheme of order, we are absolved from the tiresome labour of thought, and the
uneasy consciousness of mystery and a threatening unknown Theory services deep needs
of the human spirit: it subordinates nature to man, imposes a beautiful simplicity on the
unbearable multiplicity of fact, gives comfort in the face of the unknown and the
unexperienced, stops the teasing of mystery and doubt which, though salutary an life-
preserving, is uncomfortable, so that we seek by theory to sort out the justified from the
unjustified fear.  Theories by their nature and purpose, their role of administering to 'a good
state of mind' are thing s to be held and cherished.  Theories are altered or discarded only
then they fail us' (Shackle, 1967, 288-9).
V
The historical dimension of the essay on Astronomy is important in its own right and
provides further valuable testimony as to Smith's wide range of knowledge.  But the essay is
also significant in that Smith was able further to illustrate the operation of the 'principles' of
human nature in terms of an argument which was concerned with the origins, development,
and replacement of thought systems.   In this connection he suggested that the normal
pattern of events would follow a certain sequence: first, the development of a system,
secondly its gradual modification as new observation had to be taken account of, and third,
the rejection of the system when the degree of theoretical complexity eventually rendered it
unacceptable to the human mind.  The anticipation of Kuhn is, if not obvious, provocative.
A classic case is provided by the theory of concentric spheres; a theory which began by
accounting for observed phenomena in terms of eight spheres, but which was gradually
modified as new information became available until some 56 (Aristotle) became necessary.
As Smith put it 'This system had now become as intricate and complex as those
appearances themselves, which it had been invented to render uniform and coherent.  The15
imagination, therefore, found itself but little relieved from that embarassment, into which
those appearances had thrown it, by so perplexed an account of things' (Astronomy, IV.8).
It is this perception which prompts, in part, the attempt to formulate an acceptable
alternative.  The analysis of the processes of development and change led Smith to offer
some telling points with regard to scientific behaviour.  A few examples may suffice for the
present purpose.  To begin with, he offered an interesting assessment of the theory of
Concentric Spheres in suggesting that the initial statement had ascribed to each sphere a
circular and regular motion.  He advanced two reasons: first, that a 'circle, as the degree of
its curvature is always the same, is of all curve lines the simplest, and the most easily
conceived'; secondly he suggested that the equality of the motions of the spheres 'was
supposed by all the founders of astronomical systems.  For an equal motion can be more
easily attended to, than one which is continually either accelerated or retarded' (IV. 52).  In
the same way he drew attention to the importance of the ingenious 'equalizing circle' in the
system of Eccentric Spheres, which succeeded the Aristotelian system, on the ground that
nothing 'can more evidently show, how much the repose and tranquility of the imagination is
the ultimate end of philosophy' (IV.13).  Later he commented on the ease with which the
'learned give up the evidence of their senses to preserve the coherence of the ideas of the
imagination' (IV.35).
It was also in this connection that Smith recognised the importance of analogy in
suggesting that philosophers, in attempting to explain unusual 'appearances', often did so in
terms of knowledge gained in unrelated fields.  In this way Smith suggested that reasoning
by analogy might affect the nature of the work done, in the manner of the Pythagoreans who
first studied arithmetic and then explained 'all things by the properties of numbers' - or the
modern physician who 'lately gave a system of moral philosophy upon the Principles of his
own art' (Astronomy, II.12).  'In the same manner also, others have written parallels of16
painting and poetry, of poetry and music, of music and architecture, of beauty and virtue, of
all the fine arts; systems which have universally owed their origin to the lucubrations of
those who were acquainted with the one art, but ignorant of the other.'  Indeed, Smith went
further in noting that in some cases the analogy chosen could become not just a source of
'ingenious similitudes' but even 'the great hinge upon which every thing turned' (ibid).
This in turn leads on to the discussion of another side of the problem, again illustrated by
the Astronomy, namely that different types of philosopher may produce conflicting accounts
of the same thing, without any real possibility of communication.  Smith noted that at a
certain stage of development a system 'might continue to amuse the learned in other
sciences, but could no longer satisfy those that were skilled in Astronomy' (IV. 67); that the
Copernican system had been adopted by astronomers even though inconsistent with the
laws of physics as then known (IV.35); that the system of eccentric spheres had been
accepted by astronomers and mathematicians, but not by philosophers in general: 'Each
party of them too, had...completed their peculiar system or theory of the universe, and no
human consideration could then have induced them to give up any part of it' (IV.18).
As this implies, there may be a certain unwillingness to accept ideas formulated in a
particular way, and even resistance to the reception of new ones as a result of certain
'prejudices'.  Some of these prejudices are obvious: for example, the 'natural prejudices of
the imagination' (IV.52) which partly explained the original resistance to the idea of a moving
earth.
Others are more complex, especially those which Smith (following Hume) described as
prejudices of education.  For example, Smith pointed out that resistance to the acceptance
of Copernican ideas was partly explained by the 'Peripatetic Philosophy, the only philosophy
then known in the world' (IV. 38), and added, with reference to the system as a whole, that17
'When it appeared in the world, it was almost universally disapproved of, by the learned as
well as by the ignorant.  The natural prejudices of sense confirmed by education, prevailed
too much with both, to allow, them to give it a fair examination' (IV.35).  In the same way, the
immediate followers of Copernicus were held to have faced objections which were
'necessarily connected with that way of conceiving things, which then prevailed universally in
the learned world' (IV.39).
As Smith reminded his students, 'philosophers having each there (sic) peculiar business do
more work upon the whole and in each branch than formerly'.   But it now appears that while
the division of labour increases the quantity of science it may diminish the opportunities for
communication.  This was a matter of some moment since the 'various provinces' of
philosophy include 'a mechanical, a chymical, an astronomical, a metaphysical, a theological
and an ethical' dimension (LJ(A), p 347; LJ(B), p 492).
VI
The arguments which we have just received are interesting in the sense that they are all
concerned with the way in which philosophers behave.  The idea of pursuing academic
reputation as a source of distinction is quite striking and also consistent with Smith's point
that achievements in mathematics or in the natural sciences often seem more secure than
in some other areas.  On the other hand the natural and moral sciences present contrasting
problems of verification:
'A system of natural philosophy may appear very plausible, and be for a long time very
generally received in the world, and yet have no foundation in nature, nor nay sort of
resemblance to the truth...But it is otherwise with systems of moral philosophy and an author18
who pretends to account for the origin of our moral sentiments, cannot deceive us so
grossly, nor depart so very far from all resemblance to the truth' (TMS, VII.ii.4.14).
More striking still, is Smith's analysis of the 'principles which lead and direct' philosophical
enquiry where he considered the stimulus given to the mind by the sentiments of surprise,
wonder, and admiration; sentiments 'whose influence is of far wider extent that we should
be apt upon a careless view, to imagine' (Introd 7).  It was in this context that Smith
developed his thesis regarding the creation of intellectual 'bridges' in order to relieve the
mind from the inconvenience of a perceived 'gap' in knowledge.
The idea of a gap or interval was widely deployed by Smith, notably in the discussion of
forensic discourse and in the context of historical writing.  In the first case, Smith argued
that the author of forensic discourse should create, so far as possible, an argument which
may be made up of a number of parts, but so organised as to provide an apparently
seamless fabric.
'By this means tho he can bring proof of very few particulars, yet the connection there
makes them easily comprehended and consequently agreeable, so that when the adversary
tries to contradict any of these particulars it is pulling down a fabric with which we are greatly
pleased and are very unwilling to give up' (LRBL, ii.197).
In the case of historical discourse, which has many similarities with other forms of scientific
work, he noted that:
'We should never leave any chasm or gap in the narration even tho there are no remarkable
facts to fill up that space.  The very notion of a gap makes us uneasy' (LRBL, ii.36).19
In the case of scientific discourse Smith suggests that speculation is prompted by the need
for coherence and that the mind is best satisfied when the explanation is offered in terms of
a small number of basic principles which are plausible and familiar.
For Smith, these pre-occupations are also associated with the concept of the intellectual
system, which he likened, tellingly, to the analogy of the machine:
'Systems in many respects resemble machines.  A machine is a little system, created to
perform, as well as to connect  together, in reality, those different movements and effects
which the artist has occasion for.  A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect
together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality
performed' (Astronomy, IV.19).
It will be recalled that Smith likened the pleasure to be derived from the contemplation of
great systems of thought to that acquired from listening to a 'well composed concerto of
instrumental music' (Imitative Arts, II.30).  In WN, Smith also revealed his appreciation of
the 'beauty of a systematical arrangement of different observations connected by a few
common principles' (V.i.f.25).
The LRBL adds a further dimension to the discussion in drawing attention to the distinction
between the way in which ideas originate and the manner in which they are transmitted to
an audience.  In effect Smith argues that the rules of organisation, which refer to the
number of variables which the mind can comprehend, and to the use of the Newtonian
method of exposition, will reflect the psychology of the thinker and the appreciation which
the expositor should have for the characteristics of the auditor and of the reader.  The
issues relate to the conception, transmission and reception of ideas, together with the
subjective judgments which lie behind them.20
The arguments advanced in LRBL also serve to remind us that the philosopher may use a
variety of forms of discourse within the confines of a single work; that the scientist is capable
of seeking to convince by deploying arguments whose logic is attractive but also of seeking
to deploy the arts of persuasion.  I have argued elsewhere that Smith's treatment of the
American Question may illustrate his forensic skills (Skinner, 1996).
A final point to be noted in this context is that Smith's treatment of the different, yet inter-
connected, areas of speculation which we have reviewed may have an important
biographical value by throwing light upon the working of his own mind, and therefore upon
the structure of his major works.
VII
The distinction drawn (towards the end of the previous section) between the thinker who
creates a system (eg, Newton) and those who expound it, introduces a further set of
issues.
As we have seen, Smith gave a great deal of prominence (and thought) to the ways in which
individual philosophers as scientists behave.  Although he gave much attention to the
sentiments of surprise, wonder and admiration he did not suggest that they were the sole
motives to scientific work, and did not discount the role of a genuine desire for 'truth'.  He
also emphasised the pleasure to be derived from intellectual activity, and from the creation
and comprehension of the contributions of the philosopher.21
If he did remind us of the desire for status which partially supports the scientist in his
endeavours, he also insisted upon the point that individual men are moved by a desire not
merely for praise but praiseworthiness.
Smith did not qualify these points, but he did add some interesting reflections with regard to
the performance of the generality of academic teachers (expositors) whose business it is
to deliver accounts of systems of philosophy to an audience where both teacher and
student worked within a particular institutional environment.  Since these remarks are
among the last which Smith offered on the topic of academic behaviour, they are worthy of
more than a passing reference, especially since they apply to the performance, not so much
of the individual philosopher, as to the members of an academic community.22
Even when universities can attract professors of quality, Smith argued that it will be
necessary to provide appropriate stimuli on the ground that it 'is the interest of every man to
live as much at his ease as he can' (WN, V.i.f.7).  It was in this context that Smith drew
attention to a principle which he applied widely in his discussion of public services, namely
that 'the exertion of the greater part of those who exercise it, is always in proportion to the
necessity they are under of making the exertion' (WN, V.i.f.4).
Smith objected to a situation where high salaries might be paid irrespective of competence
or industry.  As he observed, in some universities 'the salary makes but a part, frequently
but a small part, of the emoluments of the teacher, of which the greater part arises from the
honoraries or fees of his pupils' (WN, V.i.f.6).
'In other universities the teacher is prohibited from receiving any honorary or fee from his
pupils, and his salary constitutes the whole of the revenue which he derives from his office.
His interest is, in this case, set as directly in opposition to his duty as it is possible to set it'
(WN, V.i.f.7).
While even in this situation the authority of the university could be exercised in such a way
as to ensure attention to duty, Smith was aware of another problem, namely, the dangers of
self-government:
'If the authority to which he is subject resides in the body corporate, the college, or university
of which he himself is a member and in which the greater part of the other members are,
like himself, persons who either are, or ought to be, teachers; they are likely to make a
common cause, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man to consent that his
neighbour may neglect his duty, provided he himself is allowed to neglect his own.  In the23
university of Oxford, the greater part of the public professors have, for these many years,
given up altogether even the pretence of teaching' (WN, V.i.f.8).
There were other problems which could affect academic efficiency.  Smith objected to the
fact that the privileges of graduation 'necessarily force a certain number of students to
attend some universities, independent of the merit of reputation of the teachers' while in
addition specific endowments often force students to attend particular colleges.  He added
that:
'If in each college the tutor or teacher, who was to instruct each student in all arts and
sciences, should not be voluntarily chosen by the student but appointed by the head of the
college; and, if in case of neglect, inability or bad usage, the student should not be allowed
to change him for another, without leave first asked and obtained; such a regulation would
not only tend very much to extinguish all emulation among the different tutors of the same
college, but diminish very much in all of them the necessity of diligence and of attention to
their respective pupils' (WN, V.i.f.13).
Institutional structures which did not provide adequate stimuli to the academic could,
Smith argued, also have adverse effects on the quality of research and the content of what
was taught:
'several of these learned societies have chosen to remain, for a long time, the sanctuaries in
which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection, after they
had been hunted out from every other corner of the world.  In general, the richest and best
endowed universities have been the slowest in adopting...improvements, and the most
averse to permit any change in the established plan of education...improvements were more
easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, depending24
upon their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more
attention to the current opinions of the world' (WN, V.i.f.34).
The whole tenor of this discussion seems to suggest that the performance of the teacher
can only be relied upon when he operates within an appropriate environment.
From some points of view these sections of the WN may simply represent a logical
extension of Smith's treatment of public finance with its attendant emphasis on induced
efficiency (cf Rosenberg, 1960; Peacock, 1975).
But it should be noted that Smith seems to have arrived at his conclusion after careful
consideration.  As Smith remarked to William Cullen, if the Scottish Universities were among
the best at the time of writing, this was to be attributed to broadly economic causes: 'the
salaries of the professors are insignificant.  There are few or no bursaries and exhibitions,
and their monopoly of degrees is broken in upon by all other universities, foreign or
domestic' (Corr, letter 143, dated September 174).   In the same letter Smith recorded that
he had 'thought a great deal upon this subject; and had 'enquired very carefully in to the
constitution and history of several of the principal universities of Europe'.  Smith's mature
reflections on the subject of education may well have been prompted by his correspondence
with Cullen.
Smith added yet another point which will be of interest to the modern reader.  If the
'efficiency criteria' which he identified cannot be met through self-regulation or the discipline
of the 'market', then the alternative is the involvement of what Smith called 'extraneous
jurisdictions' , which present the academic with yet a further problem;25
'The person subject to such jurisdiction is necessarily degraded by it, and instead of being
one of the most respectable, is rendered one of the meanest and most contemptible
persons in the society.  It is by powerful protection only that he can effectually guard himself
against the bad usage to which he is at all times exposed; and this protection he is most
likely to gain, not by ability and diligence in his profession, but by obsequiousness to the will
of his superiors, and by being ready, at all times, to sacrifice to that will the rights, the
interest and the honour of the body corporate of which he is a member' (WN, V.i.f.9).26
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